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I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed
to that of their general suppression.”1
“At the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets
lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme
Court.”2
[1] The United States antitrust and patent laws share a common goal: to
encourage innovation and competition with the ultimate objective of
benefiting the nation’s consumers.3 As described in the Sherman Act,4 the
*

J.D., cum laude, Temple University, 2004; M.S.E., University of Pennsylvania, 2000;
B.S.E., cum laude, Princeton University, 1997. Law Clerk to the Honorable Jan E.
DuBois, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2004-05. I
would like to acknowledge Professors David G. Post and Salil K. Mehra for their
assistance and guidance and to thank Aliza Rabinowitz for her editorial suggestions and
limitless patience during the writing of this Article.
1
V THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., New York, G. P.
Putnam’s Sons 1895).
2
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir.
1997) [hereinafter Kodak II].
3
See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance,
wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are
aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”).
4
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
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antitrust laws seek to protect free competition and consumer choice by
discouraging monopolistic behavior and other types of anticompetitive
conduct.5
[2] By comparison, the Patent Act seeks to promote innovation by
rewarding patentees with a statutorily protected monopoly right to exclude
others from their patented inventions for a limited time.6 Given that the
patent laws grant monopolies while the antitrust laws seek to proscribe
them, a question emerges from the tension between the two doctrines:
How far may a patent holder extend his patent rights without incurring
antitrust liability?
[3] Congress,7 the courts,8 and government agencies9 have recognized the
need to strike a reasonable balance between antitrust and patent law in
determining how far a patentee may extend his right to exclude others
from the use of his patented goods. At present, the Federal and Ninth
Circuits are divided on the issue of whether a patentee’s refusal to deal in
his patented property is a violation of the antitrust laws. This circuit split
is the focus of this paper.
[4] Structural shifts in the United States economy have made the
promotion and protection of innovation more pressing than ever. In the
latter half of the twentieth century, the United States began its evolution
away from a nation based primarily on heavy manufacturing,10 to a nation
where firms derive revenue11 and other less tangible value from their
intellectual property.12
5

Id. §§ 1-2.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
7
See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S14,434 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988) (illustrating Congressional
concern with interplay between antitrust and patent laws).
8
See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Kodak II).
9
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) (containing agency guidance on
the overlap and conflict between antitrust and patent laws) [hereinafter 1995 ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES].
10
In 1956, blue-collar workers ceased to make up the majority of the United States
workforce for the first time in history. SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE 4 (1999) .
11
For example, Texas Instruments, one of the world’s largest producers of electronics,
now generates more revenue from licensing its patents and winning patent infringement
cases than from sales of actual products. Id. at 5. For a comprehensive discussion of the
6
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[5] In today’s economy, the ability of high-technology firms to financially
exploit their patented inventions is of paramount importance.13 Central to
a firm’s ability to fully exploit its patented products is that firm’s right to
decide whether to sell or not to sell its products to certain customers.14
While firms do have a right to choose their customers, this right is not
unqualified; a firm’s refusal to license or sell products can give rise to
antitrust liability in certain situations.15
[6] In Kodak II, decided in 1997, the Ninth Circuit determined that a
patentee who refuses to license his patented invention to others without
legitimate business justifications for doing so has violated antitrust law.16
In 2000, the Federal Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in CSU,
L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., and held that a patentee who does not violate the
patent laws may, regardless of his business justifications, refuse to license
or sell his patented invention without incurring antitrust liability.17 The
opposing results reached in the Kodak II and Xerox cases highlight the
tension between the antitrust and patent laws as courts struggle with the
question of whether patent holders may exercise their patent rights free of
antitrust limitation.

financial and strategic benefits that firms can secure through patent licensing, see KEVIN
G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN
VALUE OF PATENTS (2000).
12
Some studies demonstrate positive correlations between a firm’s patent activity and
other indicators of that firm’s economic performance, including profitability and stock
prices. MARYANN P. FELDMAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:
AN OVERVIEW OF INITIATIVES TO FOSTER INNOVATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 56-57 (2002).
13
By one account, intellectual property comprises two-thirds of the market value of
United States corporations. Jenna Greene, Patent Office at Center Stage, NAT’L L. J.,
Jan. 15, 2001, at B8.
14
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Supreme Court noted that
“[t]he absence of a duty to transact business with another firm is . . . the counterpart of
the independent businessman’s cherished right to select his customers and his associates.”
472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985) [hereinafter Aspen Skiing II].
15
E.g., id. (reiterating that a refusal to deal with competitors can give rise to antitrust
liability where the refusal is not supported by legitimate business justifications).
16
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir.
1997) (Kodak II).
17
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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[7] By examining Kodak II, Xerox, and other related cases and statutes,
this paper will describe the current legal analyses courts apply to refusals
to deal in patented property.18 This paper will also compare and critique
several recent appellate decisions concerning patentees’ refusals to deal in
their patented goods.19 Finally, this paper will conclude with a summary
of the current state of antitrust and patent law as they each apply to a
party’s refusal to license intellectual property to competitors.20 That
section will also identify the specific issues that the courts and the
legislature should resolve in order to ensure a consistent approach to
future cases involving refusals to deal in patented goods.21
II. REFUSALS TO DEAL IN PATENTED AND NON-PATENTED GOODS
A. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Refusals to Deal
[8] Created to protect unrestrained competition, Congress designed the
Sherman Act to preserve consumer choice and promote efficiency in the
United States economy.22 Justice Black described the goals of the
Sherman Act in the following way:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on
the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress . .
. .”23

18

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
20
See infra Part IV.
21
Id.
22
See generally Carole A. Casey, Note, The Rule of Reason Analysis of Dual Distribution
Systems: Does it Further the Purposes of the Sherman Act?, 29 B.C. L. REV. 431 (1988).
23
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
19
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[9] Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, any “contract, combination . . ., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce” is illegal.24 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act applies by definition to multiple-firm conduct, but the
Supreme Court has found that certain acts of individual firms, such as
“tying” the sale of one good to the purchase of another,25 can constitute a
violation of § 1.26 For example, a patentee who commits a “tying” by
refusing to deal in his patented product unless a buyer purchases a second,
separate product, from the patentee violates § 1 of the Sherman Act.27
[10] By definition, § 2 of the Sherman Act applies to single-firm conduct
and criminalizes both actual monopolization and attempts to
monopolize.28 A patentee who uses his monopoly patent rights in one
product in an effort to secure a monopoly position in a separate product
may be acting in violation of § 2.29 To sustain a claim of monopolization
under § 2, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) the defendant has
“possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,” 30 and (2) the
defendant has engaged in “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”31

24

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (discussing conduct
commonly associated with violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, including: price fixing,
group boycotts, and group agreements to restrict output).
25
See generally Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (explaining that tying
occurs when a firm with market power in a particular product forces buyers of that
product to also purchase another product in a separate, often unrelated market).
26
See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 7 (finding a § 1 violation where a landowner tied
a land lease to the purchase of services from the landowner’s separate shipping business).
27
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992)
[hereinafter Kodak I].
28
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (“Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize .
. . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
29
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir.
1997) (Kodak II) (discussing how monopolists exploit their positions to gain monopolies
in other markets).
30
Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 481 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 57071 (1966)); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956) (defining “monopoly power” as “the power to control prices or exclude
competition”).
31
Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 481.
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[11] To prove the monopoly power element of a § 2 claim, an antitrust
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has a dominant market share
as well as the ability to control prices and exclude competition in the
relevant market.32 According to the Supreme Court, patent holders have
monopoly power in the market for their products. 33 A plaintiff must also
show that there are barriers to entry into the relevant market;34 such
barriers allow a monopolist to maintain his market share without
competition from new market entrants.35
[12] To satisfy the second requirement of a § 2 claim—that a defendant
has unfairly exercised or attempted to exercise monopoly power—a
plaintiff must show that the alleged monopolist used his monopoly power
“‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
competitor.’”36 A refusal to sell or license a product in order to leverage
or extend monopoly power into a separate market for a separate product
may violate § 2.37 If a plaintiff alleges that a monopolist engaged in such
a practice, the monopolist must demonstrate a legitimate business
justification for his anticompetitive activity.38 Examples of acceptable
business justifications for refusals to deal include: maintaining quality

32

Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 391).
E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (finding that “it
is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the [patent holder]
market power”).
34
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing an
example of a barrier to entry as a market in which would-be competitors must make a
large capital investment in order to participate).
35
Id. at 51.
36
Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107
(1948)).
37
See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217-18
(9th Cir. 1997) (Kodak II); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536,
546-47 (9th Cir. 1991).
38
See, e.g., LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (requiring
an accused monopolist to demonstrate a business-related justification for anticompetitive
conduct to avoid antitrust liability under § 2); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II) (requiring an explanation for
ski lift owner’s exclusionary actions to avoid antitrust liability).
33
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control,39 controlling inventory costs,40 and the desire to exclude others
from one’s intellectual property.41
[13] The Supreme Court has developed several analyses to find whether a
refusal to deal with competitors is an antitrust violation. The first of these
is the “intent” analysis articulated in United States v. Colgate & Co.42
This analysis requires that a court scrutinize a monopolist’s decision to
refuse to deal with its competitors by looking for any predatory intent to
perpetuate the monopolist’s controlling market position.43
[14] A second limit on a monopolist’s right to refuse to deal with
competitors arises where a monopolist in a given market controls a
commodity or service that is crucial to the ability of all other participants
in that market to compete; courts refer to such a commodity as an
“essential facility.”44 Where courts find that a monopolist has refused
access to an essential facility, the monopolist must give competitors access
to that facility on a reasonable basis.45

39

See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483.
Id. at 484.
41
See, e.g., Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
42
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
43
See id. at 307. In Colgate, the Supreme Court noted that a monopolist was free to
refuse to deal with any customer, but could not do so in an intentional effort to establish
or maintain a monopoly. Id. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., the
Court determined that a corporation’s decision to refuse to sell products to a competitor
was not motivated by anything other than an intent to create a monopoly. 273 U.S. 359,
375 (1927).
44
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983). The
Seventh Circuit has created a widely-accepted test to determine the existence of an
essential facility: (1) a monopolist controls the facility in question; (2) other market
participants cannot reasonably duplicate the facility; (3) the monopolist unreasonably
denies access to the facility to its competitors; and (4) shared use of the facility is
feasible. Id. at 1132-33.
45
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th Cir.
1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) [hereinafter Aspen Skiing I]. Courts have imposed
some limitations on the scope of the essential facilities doctrine. See, e.g., Cavalier Tel.,
LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc., 330 F.3d 176, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2003) (examining the
relationship of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the Sherman Act); Interface
Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that a firm need
not license an essential facility to a non-competitor).
40
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[15] In recent antitrust cases, the Supreme Court has favored an analysis
of a monopolist’s business justifications for his
refusal to deal over
consideration of the monopolist’s intent or whether the monopolist
possessed an essential facility.46 The following two cases illustrate the
Court’s focus on business justifications for an antitrust defendant’s refusal
to deal.
1. Aspen Skiing
[16] The first of these two cases, Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen
Skiing Co., involved a claim of monopolization by the plaintiff, Highlands,
against the defendant, Ski Co. 47 Highlands owned one of the four ski
resorts in Aspen, Colorado and Ski Co. owned the remaining three.48 The
basis of Highlands’s complaint in Aspen Skiing was that Ski Co. had
discontinued its practice of cooperating with Highlands in issuing an
interchangeable six-day pass that could be used on any of the four Aspenarea ski facilities because Ski Co. was dissatisfied with its share of the
revenues from the four-facility pass.49
[17] After discontinuing the joint Highlands-Ski Co. pass, Ski Co. (1)
replaced the four-facility pass with a pass that could only be used at one of
Ski Co.’s three facilities and (2) took additional steps to prevent Highlands
from marketing its own multi-area ticket package to replace the joint
offering.50 Unable to offer a convenient all-Aspen ticket, Highlands
“bec[ame] a day ski area in a destination resort,” and suffered a steady
decline in its share of the market for Aspen downhill ski services.51
Highlands then filed a complaint in federal court alleging that Ski Co. had
monopolized the market for Aspen ski services in violation of § 2 of the

46

See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992)
(Kodak I).
47
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (Aspen Skiing
II).
48
Aspen Skiing I, 738 F.2d at 1512.
49
Aspen Skiing II, 472 U.S. at 592-93.
50
Id. at 593. Specifically, “Ski Co. discontinued the [three]-day, [three]-area pass for the
1978-1979 season, and also refused to sell Highlands any lift tickets [to ski areas owned
by Ski Co.], either at the tour operator’s discount or at retail.” Id. (citations omitted).
51
Id. at 595. Highlands’ share of overall Aspen ski revenues declined from 20.5% in
1976-1977 to 11% in 1980-1981. Id at 595-96.
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Sherman Act.52 A jury found for Highlands,53 and the Tenth Circuit
upheld the verdict.54 The Tenth Circuit determined (1) that the multiresort ticket was an essential facility that Ski Co. was obligated to market
together with Highlands, and (2) that the jury properly found that Ski
Co.’s purpose for refusing to market the four-area ticket was motivated by
the intent to “‘create or maintain a monopoly.’”55
[18] On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Tenth
Circuit and stated that while a firm with monopoly power like Ski Co. had
“no duty to engage in joint marketing with a competitor,” a monopolist’s
right to refuse to deal was not unqualified.56 Declining to employ either
the intent or essential facilities analyses,57 the Court focused on the
objective evidence of the case and found that Ski Co. had violated § 2
because the firm had failed to provide any legitimate business justification
for its refusal to deal with Highlands.58
2. Kodak I
[19] In the second of these two cases, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc. (“Kodak I”), the Court again considered a
monopolist’s business justifications where a plaintiff claimed that the
monopolist’s refusal to deal was a violation of the antitrust laws. 59 In the
52

Id. at 595.
Id.
54
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1527-28 (10th Cir.
1984) (Aspen Skiing I).
55
Id. at 1520-21 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
The Tenth Circuit noted that Ski Co.’s refusal to cooperate with Highlands made Ski Co.
“the only business in Aspen that could offer a multi-day multi-mountain skiing
experience” and that there was no valid business reason for refusing to accept the
vouchers included in Highlands’ Adventure Pack. Id. at 1521-22.
56
Aspen Skiing II, 472 U.S. at 600-01.
57
Id. at 611 n.44.
58
Id. at 608. The Court also noted that Ski Co. had “elected to make an important change
in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted
for several years,” but that Ski Co. could not provide any legitimate business justification
for that change. Id. at 603-05. The Court concluded by noting that while Ski Co.’s
actions were not necessarily “‘bold, relentless, and predatory,’” the evidence in the case
supported the jury’s conclusion that Ski Co. had “made a deliberate effort to discourage
its customers from doing business with [Highlands].” Id. at 610 (quoting Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951)).
59
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (Kodak I).
53
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1980s, the Eastman Kodak Company sold photocopier equipment into a
highly competitive market, competing with IBM, Canon, and Xerox.60
Kodak provided replacement parts and service for its equipment and either
manufactured these replacement parts itself or purchased necessary parts
from independent original-equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”).61
[20] In the early 1980s, a number of so-called independent service
organizations (“ISOs”) emerged to address the service market for Kodak
equipment, competing directly with Kodak for the opportunity to service
Kodak photocopier equipment.62 The ISOs obtained the replacement parts
they needed from either Kodak or OEMs.63 Kodak began to restrict the
ISOs’ access to Kodak’s replacement parts as the ISOs grew more
competitive.64 To further hinder the ISOs’ entry into the Kodak copier
service market, Kodak stopped selling replacement parts to the ISOs
altogether in 1986, and convinced the OEMs not to sell replacement parts
to the ISOs.65 Because the ISOs could no longer service Kodak equipment
without a consistent supply of replacement parts, Kodak’s policy
effectively deprived the ISOs of their ability to compete with Kodak for
equipment service contracts.66
[21] In 1987, the ISOs filed an action against Kodak alleging that Kodak
(1) had unlawfully tied the sale of Kodak photocopier equipment to the
sale of service for that equipment, and (2) monopolized or attempted to
monopolize the sale of service for Kodak photocopiers by unfairly
refusing to sell or license its replacement parts to the ISOs.67 The district
court granted summary judgment to Kodak without a hearing,68 and after

60

Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir.
1997) (Kodak II).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1201. Some customers believed the ISOs’ service to be “cheaper and better” than
Kodak’s service. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17218, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1988).
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the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,69 Kodak appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
summary judgment, finding that there were sufficient factual disputes
between Kodak and the ISOs to create genuine issues of material fact on
the ISOs’ tying and monopolization claims.70
[22] Addressing the ISOs’ § 1 claim that Kodak had tied the sale of its
equipment to the sale of service, the Supreme Court determined that
questions of fact existed as to (1) whether the parts and service markets
were separate,71 (2) whether Kodak tied the sale of parts and the sale of
service together,72 and (3) whether Kodak had sufficient market power in
the tying market for parts to force parts buyers to also purchase services.73
Turning its attention to the ISOs’ § 2 claim of monopolization, the Court
first found that the ISOs had presented sufficient evidence to prove that
Kodak had clear monopoly power in the market for replacement parts.74
After establishing the likely existence of market power, the Court began
its analysis of the second prong of the ISOs’ § 2 claim that Kodak used its
monopoly power in the replacement parts market “‘to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor’”
in the service market.75
[23] First, the Court cited to Aspen Skiing for the proposition that “a firm
can refuse to deal with its competitors. But such a right is not absolute; it
exists only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.”76
The Court then noted that because the ISOs had presented evidence
69

Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the ISOs had come forward with
adequate evidence to raise sufficient factual disputes concerning the validity of Kodak’s
claimed business justifications for its policies. Id. at 618–20.
70
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464–65, 477–79,
481, 483–86 (1992) (Kodak I).
71
Id. at 462–63.
72
Id. at 463.
73
Id. at 464–78.
74
Id. at 481. The ISOs introduced evidence at trial showing that Kodak controlled nearly
100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market, and that Kodak’s
customers did not have easily obtainable substitutes for Kodak’s products or repair
services. Id.
75
Id. at 482–83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
76
Id. at 483 n.32 (citing Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S.
585, 602-05 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II)) (emphasis added).
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alleging that Kodak exercised exclusionary action to maintain its
monopoly on replacement parts and used its control over the replacement
parts market to strengthen its monopoly share of the copier service market,
Kodak’s liability turned on whether “‘valid business reasons’” could
explain Kodak’s actions.77 While Kodak advanced three business
justifications for its refusal to deal,78 the Court highlighted evidence that
rebutted each of those justifications.79 Based on the factual questions this
evidence raised about the “validity and sufficiency” of Kodak’s claimed
business justifications,80 the Court confirmed that the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case for trial.81
B. Recent Appellate Cases: Refusals to Deal in Patented Goods
[24] While the Supreme Court now routinely examines defendants’
business justifications for refusals to deal in non-patented goods,82 less
consistency exists in the appellate courts’ approaches to refusals to deal in
patented goods. Three recent appellate court cases—Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), Intergraph Corp. v.
Intel Corp. (“Intergraph”), and CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp. (“Xerox”)—
highlight the different analyses and conclusions appellate courts have
reached in evaluating refusals to deal in patented property.
1. Kodak II
77

Id. at 483 (quoting Aspen Skiing II, 472 U.S. at 605).
Kodak’s proffered justifications were: “‘(1) to promote interbrand equipment
competition by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of its service; (2) to improve asset
management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and (3) to prevent ISOs from freeriding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts, and service.’” Id. (quoting
Petitioner’s Brief at 6).
79
Id. at 483–86. The Court noted that while Kodak claimed that preventing its customers
from using ISOs helped Kodak to maintain the best-quality service for its equipment, the
ISOs presented evidence that some customers believed that service rendered by ISOs was
superior to service rendered by Kodak, thereby raising a genuine issue of fact. Id. at
483–84. The Court then found that the second justification, reducing inventory costs,
failed to explain Kodak’s refusal to sell replacement parts to the ISOs. Id. at 484–85.
Finally, the Court observed that since the ISOs had invested substantially in the service
market but not the equipment and parts market, Kodak’s third justification would
unlawfully require the ISOs to simultaneously enter two markets. Id. at 485.
80
Id. at 483.
81
Id. at 486.
82
See generally, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S 398 (2004); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
78

12

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 2

[25] After the Supreme Court denied Kodak’s motion for summary
judgment in Kodak I and remanded the case for trial,83 a jury found that
Kodak had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act and awarded the plaintiff ISOs
$71.8 million in trebled damages.84 In addition to the jury’s damage
award, the district court issued a ten-year injunctive order requiring Kodak
to sell all replacement parts and necessary technical documents to ISOs on
reasonable terms.85 Appealing to the Ninth Circuit, Kodak raised the issue
of its patent rights, arguing that because patent holders have a right to
refuse to license their patented products, Kodak’s refusal to license its
patented replacement parts to the ISOs was not illegal.86 Affirming the
district court and rejecting Kodak’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit held that
a monopolist’s refusal to license his patented product in order to exclude
competition for a separate product in a separate market could qualify as
exclusionary conduct under § 2 of the Sherman Act.87
[26] In its analysis, the Kodak II court first considered whether Kodak had
market power in the relevant market.88 Kodak argued that the market for
each individual component part itself was a separate market because no
two parts were interchangeable, thus creating thousands of individual parts
markets and requiring the ISO plaintiffs to demonstrate their inability to
obtain each of these individual replacement parts.89 The court disagreed
with Kodak and found that the relevant market consisted of all

83

See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of Kodak I.
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.
1997) (Kodak II). The jury considered only the ISOs’ § 2 monopolization claim in
assessing damages; the ISOs withdrew their § 1 conspiracy and tying claims before
closing arguments. Id.
85
Id. at 1201-02.
86
Id. at 1214. Kodak disputed a jury instruction which stated that business conduct that
is immune to antitrust liability “‘does not refer to ordinary means of competition, like
offering better products or services, exercising superior skill or business judgment,
utilizing more efficient technology, or exercising natural competitive advantages.’” Id.
(quoting Jury Instruction No. 28). In formulating this jury instruction, the district court
had rejected Kodak’s proposal to include “‘exercising lawful patents and copyrights’
amongst the list of non-exclusionary” business practices included in the jury instruction.
Id.
87
See id. at 1209.
88
Id. at 1202-03.
89
Id. at 1203.
84
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replacement parts for Kodak copiers.90 Finding that there were significant
barriers to entry into the parts market, the court found that Kodak had
monopoly power in the market for replacement Kodak parts.91
[27] Next, the court examined the second element of the ISOs’ § 2 claim:
whether Kodak had used its monopoly power “‘to foreclose competition,
to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’”92 Kodak
argued that the only basis for liability in the context of a monopolist’s
refusal to deal arose under the essential facilities doctrine, in which a
monopolist’s refusal to grant access to a product or service eliminates
competition in a downstream market.93 Declining to apply the essential
facilities doctrine, the Ninth Circuit determined that a refusal to deal was
unlawful unless supported by “a legitimate business justification.”94
[28] The court then considered whether Kodak’s exercise of its patent
rights could form such a legitimate business justification, noting that the
question it was addressing—whether a monopolist’s refusal to sell or
license a patented product creates antitrust liability in the context of a § 2
monopoly leveraging claim—was one of first impression.95
Acknowledging the public policy underlying the limited monopoly
granted to patent holders, the court recognized that patentees normally
have the right to refuse to license or sell their patented work.96 At the
same time, the court also recognized that a patentee’s right to exclude
others from their patented property was not unlimited in scope and cited to
a footnote from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kodak I for the
proposition that a patentee may not “‘exploit[] his dominant position in
one market to expand his empire into the next.’”97 The Kodak II court
90

Id.
Id. at 1206-07.
92
Id. at 1208 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 48283 (1992) (Kodak I)).
93
Id. at 1209.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1214.
96
Id. at 1215. The Ninth Circuit stated that it had not found any reported cases where a
court imposed liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license patented property. Id. at
1216.
97
Id. at 1215 (quoting Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 480 n.29). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Supreme Court’s statement in Kodak I that “power gained through some natural
advantage such as a patent . . . can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next,’” 504 U.S. at 480 n.29 (quoting
91
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then concluded that a monopolist’s desire to exclude competitors from his
patented property could be a presumptively valid business justification.98
A plaintiff could rebut this presumption of validity by showing (1) that the
patent had been unlawfully acquired or (2) that the monopolist’s desire to
exclude competitors was merely a pretext used to conceal anticompetitive
conduct.99 Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that although Kodak’s desire to exclude others from its patented
products was a presumptively valid business justification, the jury had
properly concluded that Kodak’s proffered business justifications were
pretextual.100
[29] In its opinion, the Kodak II court recognized the importance of
properly defining the scope of Kodak’s patent protection and the scope of
the relevant antitrust market for Kodak’s patented goods.101 First, the
Kodak II court found that parts and service were separate markets for
antitrust purposes.102 The court next noted that the critical inquiry in the
case was whether the service market fell within the scope of Kodak’s
patent grant.103 If the scope of the patent grant for Kodak’s patented parts
included only the antitrust market for those parts and did not also
encompass the antitrust market for service, Kodak’s refusal to sell its
patented parts in order to dominate the separate service market would fall
outside the scope of its patent grant and would therefore be illegal under §
2 of the Sherman Act.104 If, alternatively, the scope of Kodak’s parts
patent included both the parts market and the service market, then

Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)), to mean that
“the [Supreme Court] supposed that intellectual property rights do not confer an absolute
immunity from antitrust claims.” Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1216.
98
Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp.,
36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)).
99
Id. at 1219.
100
Id. at 1219-20. The court noted (1) that Kodak’s manager stated that protection of
patented items did not motivate his decision not to sell replacement parts to the ISOs and
(2) that Kodak’s blanket refusal to license included both patented and unpatented parts.
Id. at 1219.
101
Id. at 1216-17.
102
Id. at 1217. In Kodak I, the Supreme Court determined that parts and service were
separate markets for antitrust purposes. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
504 U.S. 451, 463 (1992).
103
Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1217.
104
See id.
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Kodak’s conduct would be within the scope of its patent rights and would
not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.105
[30] Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that patent law—and not
antitrust law—should determine the breadth of the patent grant and that
Kodak’s refusal to deal in its patented parts unfairly extended its patent
into the service market.106 The Kodak II analysis, which effectively
placed limits on a patent holder’s right to exclude others from their
patented goods, was explicitly criticized three years later by the Federal
Circuit in that court’s Xerox decision.107
2. Intergraph
[31] Intel is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of microprocessors.
Intel sells its processors to producers of various computer-based devices,
including computer graphics workstations; these producers are known as
original-equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”).108 Beginning in 1987, one
of these OEMs, Intergraph Corporation, manufactured computer
workstations using an Intergraph-owned patented technology known as
“Clipper.”109 In 1993 Intergraph stopped using Clipper microprocessors
and switched to an Intel-produced technology as a replacement.110 Intel
then “designated Intergraph as a ‘strategic customer’” and began to
provide Intergraph with proprietary products and technical documents.111
[32] In 1996, Intergraph charged several Intel OEM customers with
infringing its Clipper technology, and these OEMs sought indemnification
from Intel.112 After Intel and Intergraph failed to resolve their dispute
through negotiation, Intel ceased supplying Intergraph with the technical
documentation and other benefits that Intel had previously provided to
Intergraph.113 Intergraph then sued Intel for infringing the Clipper patents
105

See id.
See id. at 1220.
107
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
108
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
109
Id. at 1349-50.
110
Id. at 1350.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
106
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while also alleging that Intel’s refusal to license its technology to
Intergraph was a violation of the antitrust laws.114 Intergraph claimed that
it could no longer participate in the competitive workstation business
without access to Intel’s products.115
[33] The district court first concluded that Intel had tried to assert its
monopoly power by “attempt[ing] to coerce Intergraph into relinquishing
its intellectual property rights as a condition of Intel” continuing to supply
chips to Intergraph.116 Applying the essential facilities doctrine, the
district court found that Intel’s processor units and technical support were
essential facilities for participants in the graphics workstation market.117
The district court then held that Intel had used its monopoly power in the
processor market to unfairly leverage its own business into Intergraph’s
graphics workstation market.118
[34] On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held
that Intel was under no obligation to license its patented inventions to
Intergraph.119 The Federal Circuit stated that:
“the owner of proprietary information has no
obligation to provide it, whether to a
competitor, customer, or supplier. Precedent
makes clear that a customer who is
dependent on a manufacturer’s supply of a
component can not on that ground force the
producer to provide it; there must also be an
anticompetitive aspect invoking the Sherman
Act [to warrant imposition of antitrust
liability].”120

114

Id.
Id. at 1351.
116
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1276 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
117
Id. at 1278.
118
Id.
119
Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1362. The Federal Circuit noted that no court had ever
imposed antitrust liability for a “‘unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or
copyright.’” Id. (quoting Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kodak II)).
120
Id. at 1363.
115
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The court noted that while such a situation was present in Kodak I and
Kodak II, where Kodak had attempted to limit competition in the copier
service market by leveraging its monopoly power in the parts market, Intel
did not seek to leverage its monopoly power in the processor market into
Intergraph’s workstation market.121 The Federal Circuit then concluded
that because Intel and Intergraph did not compete with each other, Intel’s
refusal to supply its proprietary microprocessors to Intergraph was not an
antitrust violation.122
3. Xerox
[35] In Xerox, the Federal Circuit considered a case factually similar to
Kodak I and Kodak II.123 Xerox, a major manufacturer of photocopier and
imaging equipment and provider of repair services for those products,
instituted a policy under which the company would not sell its patented
replacement parts to its ISO competitors in the photocopier service market
unless those competitors were also end-users of Xerox copiers.124 The
121

Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 455, 458
(1992) (Kodak I)).
122
Id. The court noted that Intel and Intergraph did not compete in the microprocessor
market because Intergraph had abandoned production of its Clipper processors several
years before the filing of its case against Intel. Id. at 1355. The court also noted that
Intel’s actions would only affect Intergraph’s ability to succeed in the highly competitive
workstation market; an action by Intel that would affect only a single competitor in that
market did not do enough damage to that market as a whole to rise to the level of an
antitrust violation. Id. at 1359-60. In a parallel proceeding, the FTC filed an action
against Intel in 1998, alleging that Intel was a monopolist and had violated § 2 of the
Sherman Act by denying advance information about its products to customers that had
previously sued Intel for patent infringement. In re Intel Corp., 128 F.T.C. 213, at *6-7
(1998). The FTC and Intel settled the dispute with a consent order under which Intel
could initially decide whether or not to provide information to new customers and could
terminate its relationship with a customer that failed to protect Intel’s intellectual
property. Under the consent order, Intel could not discriminate among existing customers
on the grounds that Intel was involved in an intellectual property dispute with that
customer. Press Release, FTC, FTC Accepts Settlement of Charges Against Intel (Mar.
17, 1999) at http://www.ftc.gov.opa/03/intelcom.htm.
123
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
124
Id. at 1324. Xerox’s exclusionary policy initially applied only to Xerox’s six most
successful competitors in the copier service market but later included all of Xerox’s
service market competitors. Id. Along with its policy to refuse to sell parts except to
end-users of Xerox equipment, Xerox also implemented an on-site verification practice in
which Xerox representatives would visit customer sites to confirm that the Xerox parts
that customers or ISOs had purchased were actually for those purchasers’ end-use. Id.
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ISOs filed suit against Xerox, alleging that Xerox’s policy unlawfully
extended the company’s monopoly in the market for Xerox replacement
parts into the market for Xerox copier service and therefore violated the
Sherman Act.125 The district court granted summary judgment for Xerox,
finding that a patent holder’s refusal to license his patented products was
not a violation of the antitrust laws even where that refusal to license
impacted competition in more than one market.126 The plaintiff ISOs then
appealed to the Federal Circuit.127
[36] Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Xerox,
the Federal Circuit held that a patentee’s refusal to sell or license its
patented product did not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless doing so
exceeded the scope of its patent grant.128 In its holding, the Federal
Circuit explicitly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s determination in
Kodak II that a patent holder’s motivation for his refusal to deal was
relevant to the antitrust analysis.129 First, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that while the patent laws did not confer a privilege to
violate the antitrust laws,130 the antitrust laws did not abrogate a patentee’s
right to exclude others from his patented property.131 The court noted next
that although patent holders do not necessarily possess market power,132
patentees with market power were under no obligation to allow others to
license or use their patented property.133

125

See id.
In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., No. 94-2102-EEO, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23262, at *3-4 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1999); see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F.
Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D. Kan. 1997).
127
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1324.
128
Id. at 1327 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1325 (citing Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
131
Id. (citing Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1362).
132
Id. But see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984)
(observing that consumers’ inability to obtain a patented product from any source other
than the patentee gives the patentee market power).
133
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1326 (noting that, like the Ninth Circuit in Kodak I, the
Federal Circuit was unable to find any case in which a court had “‘imposed antitrust
liability for unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent’”) (quoting Intergraph Corp., 195
F.3d at 1362).
126
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[37] The Federal Circuit also considered the language of the Patent Act,
noting that § 271(d) of the Patent Act states, “‘no patent owner otherwise
entitled to relief . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . (4) refused
to license or use any rights to the patent.’”134 The Federal Circuit
interpreted § 271(d) to mean that the owner of a lawfully obtained patent
who refused to license his patented property was within his rights to do so
and that a refusal to license a lawfully obtained patent could not be
penalized under the antitrust laws.135 In the view of the Federal Circuit,
the only types of patent-related conduct that could result in antitrust
liability were (1) illegal tying arrangements,136 (2) fraud on the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),137 or (3) sham
litigation.138 In the absence of any of these situations, the Federal Circuit
found that patentees could refuse to license their patented products without
fear of antitrust liability.139
[38] The Federal Circuit also rejected the ISO plaintiffs’ reliance on
Kodak I for the proposition that a patentee could not use his patentprotected position in one product market to expand into a separate product
or service market.140 The court argued that Kodak I was a essentially a
tying case and was distinguishable from Xerox because the plaintiffs in
Xerox had not claimed that Xerox had tied the sale of patented
replacement parts to the purchases of Xerox copier repair services.141
134

Id. at 1326 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1999)).
Id. at 1327. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of § 271(d) of the Patent Act and that
statute’s applicability concerning refusals to deal in patented property.
136
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327. The Federal Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s
statement in Kodak I that “‘power gained through some natural and legal advantage such
as a patent, . . . can give rise to liability if a seller exploits his dominant position in one
market to expand his empire into the next’” as reiterating that a patent holder could not
use their statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market
beyond the scope of the patents, implicitly concluding that the service market was within
the scope of the parts patents. Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 (1992) (Kodak I)). See infra Part III.A for a
discussion of the Federal Circuit’s market scope analysis.
137
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. (stating that “[n]otably, Kodak was a tying case when it came before the Supreme
Court”).
135
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[39] Finally, the Federal Circuit declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s
rebuttable business justification analysis articulated in Kodak II and did
not examine Xerox’s business reasons for refusing to deal in its patented
products.142 Criticizing the Ninth Circuit, the Xerox court stated that the
logic of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis “requires an evaluation of the
patentee’s subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented
products for pretext . . . ‘if a [patent infringement] suit is not objectively
baseless, an antitrust defendant’s subjective motivation is immaterial.’”143
The court summarized its holding:
In the absence of any indication of any
illegal tying, fraud in the [USPTO], or sham
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the
statutory right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed
invention free from liability under the
antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire
into his subjective motivation for exercising
his statutory rights, even though his refusal
to sell or license his patented invention may
have an anticompetitive effect, so long as
that anticompetitive effect is not illegally
extended beyond the statutory patent
grant.144
[40] In sum, the Xerox court concluded that Xerox’s assertion of its patent
rights was not a violation of the antitrust laws and that Xerox’s motives or
business justifications for the refusal to deal in its patented goods were
irrelevant.
III. DISCUSSION
[41] The above review of recent appellate decisions illustrates the
contrasting legal analyses appellate courts apply to refusals to deal in
142

Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1327 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,
1072 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original).
144
Id. at 1327-28 (emphasis added).
143
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patented property. This section of the paper will discuss and distinguish
the analyses of the Federal Circuit in Xerox and the Ninth Circuit in Kodak
II and will also identify possible consequences of each court’s decision.145
This section will also propose actions that either Congress or the Supreme
Court might take to remedy the current confusion in the law and thus
ensure consistent resolution of future antitrust cases involving refusals to
deal in patented property.146
A. Comparison of Federal and Ninth Circuit Analyses
[42] The Supreme Court has stated that a patentee with market power in
one market is not necessarily immune from antitrust liability for conduct
that affects a second market147 and that courts must examine the business
justifications underlying a monopolist’s refusal to deal in his goods.148
The Federal Circuit in Xerox failed to apply this Supreme Court precedent
because it (1) allowed Xerox to leverage its patents on replacement copier
parts into markets outside of the primary market for the patented parts and
(2) failed to consider Xerox’s business justifications for its refusal to
license patented property. Although the Xerox court acknowledged certain
narrow limitations on a patentee’s refusal to license their patented
property,149 these limitations nevertheless give patentees significant
latitude to refuse to license or sell their patented property free of antitrust
liability, even where doing so leverages a patentee’s market power in their
patented product into a separate market for a different product.
[43] By comparison, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Kodak II remained
faithful to the Supreme Court precedent that the Federal Circuit ignored in
Xerox. The Kodak II court did not allow the patentee to exploit its parts
patent into the separate market for service and required the patent holder
to demonstrate legitimate business reasons for refusing to license his
patented property.150
145

See infra Parts III.A-C.
See infra Part III.D.
147
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992)
(Kodak I).
148
See id. at 483; see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 608-09 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II).
149
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327.
150
See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-19 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Kodak II).
146

22

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 2

1. Analyses of the Scope of Patent Grants
[44] The different outcomes in Kodak II and Xerox are partially explained
by the fact that the Federal and Ninth Circuit each came to different
conclusions as to whether a patent grant protects from antitrust liability a
patentee’s conduct outside of the primary market for a patented good. In
Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance of defining the
relevant markets for antitrust and patent purposes; noting that a finding of
antitrust liability “depends largely on market definition.”151 In its Kodak
II decision, the Ninth Circuit first determined that parts and service were
separate markets for antitrust purposes.152 Based on this finding, the court
then held that Kodak’s leveraging of its parts patent to dominate the
separate copier service market was a violation of the antitrust laws.153
Given that the Kodak II court found that Kodak was subject to antitrust
liability for using its patent on copier parts to exert control over the
separate antitrust market for copier service, the Kodak II court must have
found that Kodak’s patent protection for its parts covered only the antitrust
market for parts and did not also encompass the antitrust market for copier
service.154
[45] In contrast, the Federal Circuit determined in Xerox that “a patent
may confer the right to exclude competition altogether in more than one
antitrust market.”155 In the Federal Circuit’s view, a patentee who refuses
to deal in his patented property is immune from antitrust liability so long
as he does not obtain his patent through fraud, engage in sham litigation,
or engage in a tying arrangement.156 Provided that the patentee does not
commit any of these proscribed acts, the Federal Circuit found it irrelevant
151

Id. at 1217.
Id. The Supreme Court in Kodak I determined that parts and service were separate
markets for antitrust purposes. Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 463.
153
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1220.
154
For additional discussion of antitrust and patent market definitions, see Marina Lao,
Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to
Deal, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (1999).
155
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
This stands in clear opposition to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kodak II that a patent
could only confer a right to exclude competition in a single antitrust market. See Kodak
II, 125 F.3d at 1216.
156
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327.
152
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whether a patentee’s use of his patent affects markets outside of the
primary market for his patented good.157 In other words, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the scope of a lawfully obtained patent
encompasses all possible antitrust or product markets into which the
patented product is used or sold. The Federal Circuit justified its view of
the scope of patent protection by dismissing the claim that Kodak I stood
for the proposition that a seller may not exploit a dominant position in one
market to expand that domination into a separate market through a tying
arrangement.158 The Federal Circuit also distinguished Kodak I from
Xerox on the basis that Kodak I was a tying case when that case came
before the Supreme Court.159
[46] Because Kodak I was not strictly a tying case, the Federal Circuit’s
characterization of that case is incomplete. While the plaintiffs in Kodak I
did bring a § 1 tying claim against Kodak, the Kodak I plaintiffs also
brought a § 2 monopoly leveraging claim,160 and the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the Kodak I plaintiffs’ § 2 claim relies heavily on the Court’s
discussion of the Kodak I plaintiffs’ § 1 claim earlier in the case.161
Additionally, the language of Kodak I is broad enough to cover both § 1
tying and § 2 leveraging,162 and the cases that the Court cites to in Kodak I
involve both leveraging and tying.163 This suggests that the Supreme
Court in Kodak I intended for the reasoning of that case to apply to both
leveraging and tying, and, at the very least, suggests that the Supreme
Court believed that a patent holder who attempts to exploit his patent grant
is subject to antitrust limitation.
2. Consideration of Monopolists’ Business Justifications
157

Id. at 1327-28. As a necessary consequence of the Federal Circuit’s holding, any
derivative or downstream markets related to the invention at issue are within the scope of
the claims of the patented invention for purposes of antitrust immunity.
158
Id. at 1326-27.
159
Id. at 1327.
160
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (Kodak
I).
161
See id. at 480-86.
162
The Court in Kodak I noted that “power gained through some natural and legal
advantage such as a patent . . . can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next.’” Id. at 479 n.29 (quoting
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).
163
See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Kodak II).
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[47] The Supreme Court has repeatedly examined monopolists’ proffered
business justifications for their refusals to deal in their property.164 Given
this precedent, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to consider Kodak’s business
reasons for refusing to license its patented parts was more faithful to the
Supreme Court than was the Federal Circuit, which did not examine
Xerox’s business purposes for refusing to license its patented goods.
While the Federal Circuit’s refusal to consider a patentee’s motivations
may increase judicial efficiency and decrease juror confusion,165 this
approach is not consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
[48] The Federal Circuit’s refusal in Xerox to consider the second element
of the plaintiffs’ § 2 monopolization claim ignores Supreme Court
precedent that mandates that courts must examine an accused
monopolist’s business justifications for his actions.166 It is not clear why
the Federal Circuit declined to follow this business justification analysis.
The Ninth Circuit, however, in adopting a rebuttable presumption that a
patentee’s desire to exclude others from its patented goods is a valid
business justification,167 properly accounted for a patentee’s business
motivations and remained faithful to the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Kodak I and Aspen Skiing.
B. Application of § 271 of the Patent Act to Antitrust Claims
[49] The Xerox court erred in its application of § 271(d)(4) of the Patent
Act to support its determination that patentees are not liable under the
antitrust laws for a refusal to license their patented goods;168 the court
imported law relevant only to patent infringement and patent misuse into a
case that dealt strictly with antitrust law issues. While the literal language
164

E.g., Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 608-10 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919).
165
See R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights, 10 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 429, 439-40 (2002) (discussing the difficulties inherent in elucidating a
monopolist’s true motivation for refusing to license his patented goods).
166
See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483 (noting that once an antitrust plaintiff demonstrates that
the antitrust defendant has monopoly power in the relevant market, the defendant must
advance “valid business reasons” to justify its actions).
167
Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218.
168
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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of § 271(d) may appear applicable to a case such as Xerox, a careful
examination of the section’s language and legislative history suggests that
the section is not applicable to antitrust violations and that courts should
only apply § 271 to actions arising out of patent infringement.
[50] First, the literal language of § 271 suggests that Congress intended
for the statute to govern only patent infringement actions.169 Section 271
of the Patent Act is entitled “Infringement of patent,”170 and begins by
describing those acts that qualify as patent infringement.171 Even the title
of the section suggests that the Federal Circuit erred in applying § 271 to
the facts of Xerox; Xerox did not raise any issues of patent infringement
before the Federal Circuit.
[51] Second, § 271 describes actions that do or do not qualify as patent
misuse in an infringement action but does not address issues of antitrust
liability. Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to an infringement
action; an infringement defendant who invokes a patent misuse defense is
essentially alleging that the plaintiff patent holder has unlawfully
exceeded the proper scope of his patent grant.172 The Supreme Court has
stated that patent misuse exists separately from antitrust law173 and that
patent misuse qualifies as an antitrust violation only when the party
claiming antitrust injury from the alleged patent misuse can also prove all
of the necessary elements of his antitrust claim.174
169

See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983) (reiterating
that the starting point for statutory interpretation is the literal language of statute).
170
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
171
See id. Section 271 of the Patent Act defines an infringer as one who “without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor.” Id.
172
Conduct that qualifies as patent misuse includes (1) a situation where a patentee has
obtained his patent through fraud on the USPTO, and (2) so-called sham litigation in
which a patentee brings an infringement claim in bad faith (i.e. with knowledge that the
asserted patents are in fact invalid) in order to disrupt the infringement defendant’s own
business relationships. Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc. 174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
173
See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944).
174
See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp, 382 U.S. 172,
174 (1965). The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have also
determined that patent misuse is not an antitrust violation unless the antitrust plaintiff can
prove the necessary elements of their antitrust claim. See 1995 FED. ANTITRUST
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[52] Specifically, § 271(d) states that:
[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to
relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied
relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of
his having done one or more of the
following . . . (4) refused to license or use
any rights to the patent.175
In Xerox, the Federal Circuit interpreted this language to mean that
Xerox’s refusal to license its patents to the ISO service providers was not
an illegal extension of its patents that exposed Xerox to antitrust
liability.176 Because patent misuse and antitrust law are independent
doctrines,177 however, the Federal Circuit may have overextended the
Patent Act by applying the patent misuse principles of § 271(d) to the § 2
Sherman Act antitrust claims at issue in Xerox, where the plaintiff ISOs
had not made any allegations of patent misuse.
[53] Third, the legislative history of § 271 of the Patent Act suggests that
Congress did not intend for the statute to immunize patent holders from
the antitrust laws. The unadopted Senate version of § 271 contained
language that explicitly discussed antitrust law and established a
presumption against finding that a patentee’s conduct with respect to the
sale of their patented invention could constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws.178 Because Congress declined to enact a version of the statute that
GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 (stating that patent misuse may violate § 2 of the
Sherman Act where elements otherwise necessary to establish a § 2 violation are present).
175
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
176
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
177
See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 177-78; United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963); see also 1995 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra
note 9, at 32.
178
The proposed Senate version of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) read:
[i]n any action in which the conduct of an owner . . .
of an intellectual property right is alleged to be in
violation of the antitrust laws in connection with the
marketing or distribution of a product or service
protected by such a right, such right shall not be
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specifically addressed antitrust claims, Congress may not have intended
for § 271 to apply outside of patent infringement cases.179
[54] In light of its language and legislative history, § 271(d)(4) of the
Patent Act stands for the narrow rule that a patentee’s refusal to license or
sell his patented good does not constitute patent misuse in an infringement
action. The statute does not mandate that a court immunize that same
refusal to license or sell from antitrust liability. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit in Xerox may have erred by importing a principle of patent misuse
applicable only to patent infringement actions into a case based entirely on
antitrust liability where neither litigant had alleged either patent
infringement or patent misuse.
C. Possible Consequences of the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Xerox
[55] While the simplicity of the Federal Circuit’s approach to refusals to
deal in patented property is attractive, adopting the Xerox rule would have
greater negative consequences for the nation’s consumers than would
adopting the Ninth Circuit’s rule in Kodak II. By granting patentees nearcomplete freedom to leverage their patented goods across all markets in
which those goods participate—including the downstream service or
repair markets for those products—the Xerox rule creates additional

presumed to define a market or to establish market
power, including economic power and . . .
monopoly power.
134 CONG. REC. S14,434 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988). In testimony supporting this
unenacted version of 35 U.S.C. § 271, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) noted his approval of
the language of the bill that would make a finding of antitrust liability against patent
holders more difficult; the bill would prevent courts from presuming that patent holders
have market power, the first element of a § 2 Sherman Act claim. See id. (opining that
“[t]he mistaken characterization of intellectual property rights as automatically granting
power over a particular market has led to unnecessary harsh treatment of patents . . . in
some antitrust cases” where courts imposed liability on patent holders).
179
The Ninth Circuit in Kodak II noted that while some courts and commentators had
argued that Congress’s passage of the amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) “‘may even herald the
prohibition of all antitrust claims . . . premised on a refusal to license a patent,’” the
language of the statute and other case law did “not compel such a result.” Image
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kodak II) (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,
1187 (1st Cir. 1994)).
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barriers to new businesses that seek to participate in derivative markets
related to patented products.180
[56] Despite its shortcomings, the Federal Circuit’s approach has some
benefits. First, the rule is a predictable and consistent bright-line that
monopolists, judges, and juries can easily understand. Second, one could
argue that holding lawful patent-related conduct immune from antitrust
laws might provide additional financial incentives for future invention181
because patent holders will be able to exclude competition in the lucrative
service and repair markets for their patented goods, without running the
risk of unforeseen antitrust liability.182 The Xerox rule will also make for
more efficient disposition of cases involving refusals to deal in patented
property because courts following Xerox will not have to subjectively
divine a monopolist’s true intent for refusing to deal in his patented
property.183
[57] Nevertheless, the Xerox decision will likely have negative
consequences for inventors and smaller businesses. First, because the
Xerox rule permits patentees who dominate a market to extend their
dominance into other markets so long as they do not engage in a tying
arrangement, smaller competitors may be excluded from derivative
markets for the service or repair of patented goods. These derivative
markets are important to the nation’s economy, since such markets
180

As an example of the size of service markets, IBM signed technology service contracts
worth $17.1 billion in the fourth quarter of 2003. IBM, Quarterly Earnings: IBM
Reports 2003 Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year Results, at
http://www.ibm.com/investor/4q03/4q03earnings.phtml (Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter IBM
Quarterly Earnings].
181
See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
761, 789-90 (2002).
182
The Ninth Circuit noted that imposing antitrust-based limits on the rights of
intellectual property holders may lessen firms’ incentive to innovate, particularly where
firms found guilty of antitrust violations are subject to treble damages. Kodak II, 125
F.3d at 1218; see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) (“If the
threat of treble damage liability for refusing to license were imbedded in the minds of
potential patent holders as a likely prospect . . . the efficacy of the economic incentives
afforded by our patent system might be severely diminished.”); see also Carrier, supra
note 181, at 793 (acknowledging patentees’ desire to avoid unforeseen liability due to
consumer use of a patented product outside the product’s primary market).
183
See Pate, supra note 165, at 439 (noting that reliance on ambiguous evidence of a
monopolist’s intent is “likely to increase the costs and burdens of litigation and reduce
the accuracy of decisions”).
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generate significant revenue and employment opportunities.184 This
market dominance is exacerbated in today’s high-technology economy,
where so-called network effects185 create a tendency toward single-firm
dominance in a particular product market and increase the size of a market
over which that single firm dominates.186 Accordingly, the Xerox rule
paves the way for a high-technology patent holder who dominates a large
market through network effects to exclude competitors from large
derivative markets by refusing to deal in patented goods needed to provide
service or repair to his other widely-sold products.
[58] A second negative effect of the Xerox decision is that the decision
may discourage innovation in derivative markets outside of a patented
good’s primary market. Because the Xerox rule ensures that patent
holders will control all derivative markets related to their patented good, a
likely result of this control will be a decrease in the level of competitiondriven innovation in those markets.187 Such a decrease in innovation may

184

See IBM Quarterly Earnings, supra note 180.
The concept of network effects is exemplified by the markets for communications
equipment or computer operating systems, in which one individual’s demand for a
particular company’s product or service is positively related to the spreading use by
others of that product. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved
Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539 (2001). One
need look no further than the continued dominance of Microsoft’s Windows operating
system for an illustration of the power of network effects.
186
Although network effects may allow a monopolist to increase the size of the market
over which he dominates, rapid advances in technology may force a monopolist to adapt
to those changes or lose its controlling market position. See id. at 541 (“On average,
market power is probably less durable in the high-technology sector of the economy.”);
see also S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, High Technology, Antitrust, & the
Regulation of Competition: Should Technology Choice be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?,
9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 318 (1996) (“Since high technology changes so frequently, a
firm that achieved monopoly with one technology will not be able to hold on to its lead
unless it is extremely resourceful.”).
187
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-701 (1998), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits
=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=Anticommons&searchid=1095251557308_4693&st
ored_search=&FIRSTINDEX=0 (arguing that excessive patent protection may stifle
innovation in important derivative markets for patented goods).
185

30

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 2

adversely impact consumers and runs counter to the goals of both the
antitrust and patent laws.188
[59] A final concern with granting excessive latitude to patentees who
refuse to deal in their patented goods is that some patentees may be able to
assert so-called “junk patents” against their competitors without any
antitrust limitation. The USPTO currently receives an all-time high
number of patent applications,189 and some believe that a result of this
ever-increasing workload is the issuance of so-called “junk patents” that
grant their owners the right to exclude others from making commonlyused items.190 As an example, the USPTO has recently issued patents on
such items as crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwiches191 and bread
refresheners.192 The Federal Circuit’s decision to allow near-limitless
power to patent holders who exercise their patent rights raises the
possibility of a “junk patent” holder leveraging his patent rights across
multiple markets without any antitrust-based limits on that power.
D. Proposed Solutions to Conflicting Recent Appellate Decisions
[60] Application of the Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit’s respective
analyses of refusals to deal in patented property leads to differing
outcomes for patent holders who have refused to license or sell their
patented property. As a result, patent holders are left with considerable
uncertainty as to how far they may extend their statutory patent rights.
This uncertainty will likely lead to future litigation as parties seek to
188

For example, the Supreme Court noted in Kodak I that some of Kodak’s service
customers preferred the ISOs’ service to that of Kodak. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483-84 (1992).
189
See Michael S. Malone, The Smother of Invention, FORBES ASAP, June 24, 2002, at
32. Over the last twenty years, there has been a meteoric rise in the number of patent
applications received by the Patent and Trademark Office. As of 2002, the USPTO was
receiving more than 375,000 patent applications each year and was faced with a backlog
of more than 350,000 applications. Id.
190
See Pitofsky, supra note 185, at 543; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 606 (1999). See IPWatchdog’s website for a
regularly updated listing of obscure and useless patents issued by the PTO. IPWatchdog,
Museum of Obscure Patents, at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patentmuseum.html (last
visited Dec. 28, 2004).
191
U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999).
192
U.S. Patent No. 6,080,436 (issued June 27, 2000).
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definitively establish when a refusal to license a patented good violates
antitrust law. A solution to this uncertainty could come in the form of
either an amendment to the Patent Act to establish that patent-related
conduct is not insulated from the antitrust laws, or a Supreme Court
decision that affirms either Kodak II or Xerox.
[61] Congress could harmonize the discord in the courts’ approaches to
refusals to deal in patented property by amending the Patent Act. One
place for such an amendment is § 154 of the Patent Act;193 that section sets
forth the rights of a patent holder and is a logical location for Congress to
set out a limitation on patent holders’ rights.194 A possible remedy to the
current confusion in the law would be to amend the language of § 154 to
include, “a patent holder’s right to grant or refuse access to or the purchase
of his patented invention is subject to all other laws protecting this
nation’s trade and commerce.” Making such an amendment would
provide a clear statement to courts and patent holders that the exercise of
patent rights is subject to antitrust limitations.195
[62] An alternative method for creating a settled standard for analysis of
refusals to deal in patented property would be for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in a future case where a litigant alleges that a refusal to
deal in patented property is a violation of antitrust laws.196 Should this
occur, the Supreme Court should affirm Kodak II; doing so would be
consistent with the Court’s own precedent and also with the analysis that
many courts apply to § 2 monopolization cases. Although affirming
Kodak II would require that courts perform a labor-intensive examination
of the business justifications underlying a patentee’s refusal to deal in their
193

35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
In relevant part, § 154(a)(1) states, “[e]very patent shall contain . . . a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention.” Id. § 154(a)(1).
195
Some commentators have suggested that Congress amend the language of 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(4) to state that a patent owner shall not be guilty of misuse or illegal extension of
their patent for a refusal to license that patented good “in the primary market for the
patent good.” E.g., Patrick H. Moran, Comment, The Federal and Ninth Circuits Square
Off: Refusals to Deal and the Precarious Intersection Between Antitrust and Patent Law,
87 MARQ. L. REV. 387, 421 (2003).
196
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Kodak II, Image Technical Services., Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094
(1998), and Xerox Corp., CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S 1143 (2001).
194
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patented property, courts already perform such examinations in antitrust
cases,197 and such a rule would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s
own precedent in Kodak I.198
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
[63] The question of whether a patent holder who refuses to license his
patented property should be immune from antitrust liability is a difficult
one, and appellate courts have reached different conclusions on this issue.
Given the current state of the law, patentees are faced with considerable
uncertainty as to how far they may extend their patent rights and it is not
clear what effect that uncertainty will have on future innovation and
competition.
[64] While the above-discussed cases differ in their conclusions as to
whether a patent holder who refuses to license his patent should incur
antitrust liability, courts agree that a refusal to license patented goods
violates the antitrust laws in certain situations.199 First, a patentee who (1)
engages in patent misuse by asserting a patent obtained through fraud on
the USPTO or (2) initiates a sham infringement proceeding against a
defendant in an effort to interfere with the defendant’s own business
relationships is subject to antitrust liability if the patentee’s opponent can
show that the two elements of a § 2 monopolization claim are met.200
Second, a patentee may not tie the sale of his patented product to the
purchase of a different product in a separate market.201

197

See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(performing an exhaustive examination of a software company’s proffered businessrelated justifications for allegedly anticompetitive licensing and product integration).
198
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (Kodak
I) (stating that antitrust liability for firms accused of leveraging a monopoly from one
market into another depends on whether “‘valid business reasons’” could explain the
firm’s actions) (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 605 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II)).
199
See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A
patentee’s refusal to deal in patented property can lead to antitrust liability only where the
patentee and the would-be licensee are direct competitors. See id. at 1363.
200
See Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1326; see also Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc.,
174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
201
See Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327.
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[65] The Kodak II and Xerox decisions demonstrate two differing
approaches to resolving the tension between patent law and antitrust law
from a refusal to deal in patented goods, and each approach will lead to
different repercussions for the nation’s consumers. The Federal Circuit’s
Xerox decision elevates patent rights above antitrust limitations and does
not consider a patentee’s subjective motivation for his refusal to deal in his
patented goods. Xerox thus enables a patentee to avoid antitrust immunity
by simply invoking his statutorily-granted patent right to exclude. This
decision has the potential to deter competition and innovation in derivative
markets related to the primary market for a patented good, and the
deterrence of innovation runs counter to the goals of both antitrust and
patent law.
[66] By comparison, the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II did not prioritize patent
rights over antitrust limitations because that court considered whether a
patentee’s business motives could legitimately support a refusal to license
his patented property. However, a Kodak II-style subjective analysis of a
patentee’s motivations is inherently unpredictable and may leave patent
holders without clear boundaries on extending their patent rights into new
markets. As a consequence of Kodak II, some firms may decline to invest
in innovative activities for fear of incurring antitrust liability from
inadvertently overextending their patent rights. Until either Congress or
the Supreme Court takes the initiative to resolve the current discord in the
law governing refusals to deal in patented property, patent holders and
those who are denied access to patented goods will continue to operate in
a state of uncertainty.
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